# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

**CURTIS J. NEELEY, JR.** 

CASE NO. 09-CV-5151

**Plaintiff** 

**DECEMBER 9, 2010** 

VS

NAMEMEDIA, INC.; NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC.; and GOOGLE, INC.

**Defendants** 

# MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JIMM LARRY HENDREN U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS

#### **APPEARANCES**

MR. CURTIS J. NEELEY, JR. 2619 North Quality Lane, Apt. 123 Fayetteville, AR 72703 PRO SE PLAINTIFF

MC IENNIEED HALTON

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6500 Summerhill Road, Suite 100 Texarkana, TX 75503 FOR DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.

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(Proceedings recorded by Stenomask; transcript produced from dictation)

### DECEMBER 9, 2010

THE COURT: The Court calls up for consideration a case that's styled Curtis J. Neeley, Jr., Plaintiff, versus NameMedia, Inc., Network Solutions, and Network Solutions, Inc. and Google, Inc.

The matter comes on today for the Court to address what it perceives to be a motion and a request by the pro se plaintiff for the Court to recuse.

Is the plaintiff present and ready to proceed?

MR. NEELEY: I am present, Your Honor. I am scared to death, but I am ready to proceed.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Neeley, please don't be scared to death. You're too young for that, I think, so just relax and we'll have the hearing and see if we can address the matter that I've called up here.

Are the defendants present and ready to proceed?

MS. DOAN: We are, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I understand we have Ms. Jennifer Doan. You'll be representing Google, and along with Mr. Mike Page, and Mr. Brooks White for NameMedia?

MR. WHITE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Welcome. You may be seated.

The matter comes on for hearing this afternoon

pursuant to the Court's sua sponte order. Mr. Neeley, in one of your pleadings -- and this is Document Number 208 I think, filed November 12th of 2010. The style of that pleading I think is Final Brief Supporting Motion for Docket 198 Joining Claims and Parties. But in the body of that document, specifically on its last -- well, on Page 6 of 7, you make the statement: "Whereas, therefore herein the pro se plaintiff prays that the Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren recuse himself from further participation in the case."

Now, that's not a formal motion for recusal, but when that is mentioned, I think the Court has an obligation to inquire into it, so hence the reason for this hearing, because if the Court is obliged to recuse, it should do so straightaway and have another judge assigned so that this case can proceed on to final resolution.

So I'll turn to you, Mr. Neeley, and ask if you wish to present any evidence or provide any argument supporting your notion that the Court should recuse. Do you have any evidence you wish to present or any argument you wish to make?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Do so, please.

MR. NEELEY: I have one exhibit here which is Arkansas Code 16-123-102, Definitions.

THE COURT: Is that a statute to which you refer, sir?

1 MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir, it is. 2 THE COURT: All right. Kitty, would you go over and 3 take it from the gentleman? And counsel for the defendants, are you aware of this 4 5 statute to which Mr. Neeley refers? MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor. 6 7 MS. DOAN: We're not, Your Honor. We're looking at 8 it. 9 THE COURT: While they're looking at that, Mr. Neeley, we don't introduce normally in court copies 10 11 That's a matter of law that the Court can and does statutes. 12 notice. It isn't a matter to be proven by submitting it in 13 evidence. I'll permit it this time. I presume you wish to 14 talk about the contents of that statute, and so the counsel are 15 now familiar with it. What's the cite again, please? 16 MR. NEELEY: Your Honor --17 THE COURT: Let me see it, please. All right. It is 18 16 -- Ark. Stat. Ann., Section 16-123-102? 19 MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir. 20 THE COURT: All right. Do you need this back, Mr. 21 Neeley? 22 MR. NEELEY: No, sir. 23 THE COURT: All right, sir. Then the Court notes 24 that you are referring to that statute. I presume you wish to

make comments about it, so go ahead.

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MR. NEELEY: In the original, I do not understand the rationale for having denied 97, I guess back in -- with 125. Basically, every use of Dennis factors I have not seen the listing of why anything I had asked to be -- like the -- the issues that I see in evidence, I do not think are in this case. I have attempted to add them several times, and I'm not very good at adding them, but the fact that I've attempted has been denied. And not because they're not there; just because I've -- I don't really guess I understand why. And --

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. NEELEY: Oh, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. NEELEY: One of the issues I had was that the definition of disability in Arkansas statute says: "A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life function," and this is very much like what was found in -- by the Supreme Court. And when Arkansas revised this statute in 1999, as the Court noted, and removed the third disability of being a -- imprisoned outside of Arkansas, they also removed the word "dimwit" and "idiot" because it was not -- no longer felt to be politically correct. And they did -- they did not -- the definition was in the statute already.

Within the statute it says: "A disability that impacts a major life function." And they felt by that -- I believe that they felt that that included any -- any number of

disabilities, and it would have complied with what the Supreme Court had found, that it was a life function that was impugned, which I have a couple of those.

And I believe that when the Judge -- I'm sorry. Your Honor, I'm sorry, I don't know how -- when the Court ruled that specifically a minor who was in prison and insane out of the state of Arkansas was what was removed, I do not believe that is logical. I do not believe it is logical in any way to think that Arkansas, although it is known to be a backwards area, Arkansas does not regularly imprison minors who are -- minors who are insane. And that was a logical defect I felt that any juror or any person would see, that, gosh, it's not because they took out that. It's because they took out the two offensive terms. And that was my concern about logical life disabilities.

THE COURT: All right. And those are your reasons for suggesting that -- or asking the Court to recuse. Anything else?

MR. NEELEY: I don't suppose there are, other than I do not understand how Dennis factors can be used --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think I understand, Mr. Neeley, and I think I understood this coming in, that you disagree with the Court's ruling. You feel it's wrong and illogical. Is that correct?

MR. NEELEY: That is correct.

THE COURT: All right. Anything other than that?

MR. NEELEY: I feel that Your Honor has demonstrated, in 1990- -- or, excuse me, 2003, an extreme judicial ability to determine that a Harry Potter book was disparaged by being put on a shelf by itself and requiring parental permission to read, and that this setting off aside in the library was actually discriminating against the free speech --

THE COURT: Would it surprise you to know, Mr.

Neeley, that when I made that ruling, there were many people
who disagreed with it? Not everybody thought it was a
brilliant ruling, as you apparently think it was.

MR. NEELEY: Well, that may be --

THE COURT: Which is very usual, Mr. Neeley. I've been on the bench for about 18 and a half years now, and I notice that many of my rulings please some, don't please others. It's about 50/50.

MR. NEELEY: That --

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, sir?

MR. NEELEY: I believe that that ruling is almost exactly the opposite of saying that allowing my nude photographs to be shown in the library as a result of a search of my name is not disparaging to me, which it is, and that was what I thought was odd, that you saw in 2003, and then did not see today, that my daughter can go to the library in the safe search and type in her father's name, which is not terribly

unexpected to do, and see naked pictures.

THE COURT: Okay. So you disagree -- I think that's the same thing. You disagree with the ruling that the Court has made in this case, right?

MR. NEELEY: I -- I am -- I suppose I do, yes.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying to understand, Mr. Neeley. That's why I'm having this hearing. If you say you believe the Court should recuse, I need to have on the record and have an explanation as to why. I think what I've heard now is that you think the Court's rulings in this case are illogical and you don't understand them and you disagree with them. Is that right?

MR. NEELEY: That is correct.

THE COURT: Anything other than that that you believe is a reason why the Court should recuse?

MR. NEELEY: I don't suppose I -- I am so confused,
I have no idea. I thought that acting -- ruling in a way that
was illogical was not --

THE COURT: Well, we've mentioned that. I understand you feel that way. I'm asking is there anything in addition to that that you believe would require this Court to recuse?

MR. NEELEY: I do not believe so. I have no idea.

I did not mean exactly -- I have no idea why I did. I'm confused altogether, and I felt that it was wrong, that it was illogical, and I did not know the judge, did not know yourself

or anything to do with the courts, and I felt that if it -- if it was illogical in one case, it would be illogical in another case.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I just want to be sure I give you a chance to fully inform me as to what the basis is.

Are you satisfied that you have?

MR. NEELEY: I am satisfied that I have said what I thought, although I think -- I don't think recusing is what I would prefer. I believe I used the language incorrectly.

THE COURT: Oh, now I'm confused.

MR. NEELEY: Oh, dear.

THE COURT: Are you in fact suggesting that I should recuse, sir, or not?

MR. NEELEY: I have no idea currently. I believe that I am unaware of whether or not logical -- logic will be followed or not followed.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Neeley?

MR. NEELEY: I do not believe I have anything specific in that. However, I feel that there are many issues that were illogical, and the fact that I am unable to communicate effectively has impacted that all the way through.

I believe that there are things that Google, Incorporated and NameMedia, Incorporated have done that are wrong and that are illegal and I have -- I thought that I brought to the court, although I must not have. I thought I

did, and I think I could easily now; however, I do not think it is relevant to my staying -- asking your court to recuse.

I guess what I said was, in effect, if you can't see this, then maybe we should get another judge, and it just is a old -- as an improper -- I should not have said such a thing.

I say things when I believe them, and I often do not run them past the part of the brain that says you shouldn't say that.

And sometimes I suppose I type them.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Neeley, let me give a chance to your opponents for comments. Ms. Doan, do you have comments or responses?

MS. DOAN: Your Honor, I think that Mr. Pace is going to make the comments for both if that's okay.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. PACE: Very briefly, Your Honor. We oppose the motion. We think that there is no basis for the Court to recuse. We think the Court has been, if anything, overly fair to Mr. Neeley and has shown no bias whatsoever. So we would oppose the motion and submit on that basis.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you.

Mr. White, any comments?

MR. WHITE: Just briefly, Your Honor. As Your Honor knows, you can't request a new judge because you don't like the rulings the judge is making. Mr. Neeley has not presented anything in the way of bias that Your Honor has, and for that

reason, we would also oppose the motion.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

All right, Mr. Neeley, anything further you wish to say having heard their comments?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, Your Honor. I did not mean to ask or make a motion for the judge to recuse. I said it, and I was more along the lines of I believe Mr. Brooks White said, or maybe it was -- I can't remember. One of the opponents said I did not like the ruling, did not think it was logical, and wanted it changed. And I should not have, and if I would -- I would like to say I would like to not have a recusal, that that was just a improper emotional response that I should not have typed.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Well, Mr. Neeley, I appreciate the comments that you've made here in open court. I have a few observations to make. I think the central concern that gave rise to your remarks about the need to recuse and this hearing was an unhappiness with the Court's view of law which applies. I think you were concerned about precedent being somewhat old. But I will remind you, sir, the bedrock law of this nation is old, the United States constitution. It doesn't make it any less effective or any less viable or any less appropriate than it was when it was enacted well over 200 years ago.

But given that notion, I will tell you a personal

anecdote. Not too long ago, I had occasion to be in the audience when Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was being interviewed, and we've become friends over the years, and he was asked the question by a reporter: "How do you feel, Justice Thomas, when the media accuses you of being Antonin Scalias's lapdog, and that you don't think for yourself, and you just follow Justice Scalia's turn?" And he said words to this effect: "I did not take an oath to please the media. I did not really take an oath to please the people. I took an oath to uphold the constitution of the United States of America, and that's what I try to do on a daily basis."

Then for some inexplicable reason, out of a company of about 50 federal judges, he pointed straight to me, and he called me by name and said: "You know, Jimm, that if everybody thinks you're doing a great job and you're getting everything right, you ought to worry about that. If everybody thinks you're completely stupid and getting everything wrong, you ought to worry about that." He said, "As long as about 50 percent of the people think you're doing good and the other 50 percent think you're not, you're probably doing okay."

Since he had called me out, I felt the privilege to respond, and I said something like this: "Well, Mr. Justice, by that token, I think I'm probably ahead of the game. About 60 percent of the people think I'm a wild-eyed idiot that should have never been on the federal bench in the first place,

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and maybe 40 percent think, well, maybe with a little bit more seasoning, he might kind of get a few things right."

So it is not uncommon, sir, for litigants to disagree with rulings that judges make. It is commonplace. And I'm sure these attorneys that are seated at this table can tell you that. That is among the reasons why we have appellate courts, so that if a judge errs, and we do because we are human, there is a place to appeal that, to a higher court, to right that wrong. But that is the way that it is supposed to operate, and must.

If I care about who wins an argument, then I would recuse myself because I could not be fair and impartial. job is to call it like I see it, without regard to who's on one side or the other. You may have noticed many representations of the symbol of justice, Dame Justice holding the scales. blindfolded Have you noticed, sir, she's in I believe the reason is, her task is not to representation? see who is putting evidence on either side of the scale. task is to hold that scale rock steady without tilting it one way or the other so that a jury, an impartial finder of fact, can decide which way it weighs heavier. That is my job as a presiding judge in this case, to call it like I see it, to make rulings on objections and motions, and to do the best I can to apply the law as I'm able to understand it, proper and fairly.

If I am wrong, then when the matter is over, then

there is the right of appeal. On certain issues, there are such things as interlocutory appeals, of which I'm sure you may know. But objections about the Court's rulings that have been made thus far, in my judgment, are not subject to interlocutory appeal. I suppose if they were, that you might avail yourself of that. But that is the proper way to challenge or disagree with the Court's ruling.

I don't know if you ever follow or attend sporting events, Mr. Neeley, but many do. Now, if you were a spectator at a sporting event and you disagreed with a call made by a referee or an official, I doubt you would say to that official, "Excuse me, sir, but I believe you missed that call. Perhaps your view of the play was obscured." I don't think you'd say that. I think you, like me, might say something like this: "Boo. You missed that, you bum. What are you, blind?"

Now, Mr. Neeley, when you're in a court of law, a United States District Court, and you feel that the judge has missed a call and you disagree with it, it's not proper to say, "Boo. You missed that, you senile old jerk. Why don't you retire before you're impeached." It's totally improper and will not be permitted.

If you have the need to comment on a ruling, it might be appropriate for you to say: "Your Honor, I respectfully disagree with your ruling," and then appeal it when the time comes. Do you see the difference, Mr. Neeley? It's the forum

in which we are.

MR. NEELEY: I believe I do, sir, and I believe I can't apologize for what I did now. I can't -- once I've said it, you can't unsay it.

THE COURT: I understand that and I appreciate that

-- that sentiment, and I believe you've expressed it well here.

But I want to encourage you -- and, frankly, I'm not singling
you out, Mr. Neeley. These lawyers, I don't know all of them.

I know -- I've seen the lady, Ms. Doan. Forgive me for not
being able to call up your name. But there have been times
when I have given this same speech to lawyers, to say, "Hey,
back it down a notch or two. You're in a court of law. You're
not at a sporting event where you can call names and get crude
about it."

This is a forum in which we try to decide things without bats and clubs and guns and knives, but in a civilized and courteous manner. So that's why it's common -- you have done that in your pleadings. You say "The Honorable Judge Hendren", and I appreciate that. That's the proper mode of address to a sitting judge. One of the lawyers, I think, said when he got up, "May it please the Court." The idea behind that civilized discourse is to, hopefully, promote the idea that your issues in this case will be decided based on the facts and the law, not on personalities, and not because somebody is angry with you. So that's why we have these rules

of appropriate discourse.

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So I encourage -- and I have my lawyer here in court, Ms. Kitty Gay, and she -- she and I disagree sometimes, but we have noticed that when folks load up their pleadings with lie," saying, "Oh, that's a or "That's blatantly misleading", that helps us not at all to focus on the issue we're trying to decide, to decide the matter fairly under the law which applies. And when someone resorts to name calling or just intemperate wording, it does nothing to help your cause. It obstructs it. It causes us to sit back and say, "What's going on here? Why is this happening?"

So I hope you understand, Mr. Neeley. I believe you've said you really do not ask the Court to recuse, and I'll accept that, but I must say that nothing has occurred that would warrant a recusal in the case. You may disagree with me. I daresay these lawyers over here probably disagree with me. If they haven't yet, I'm sure they will before this is over, but that will not be a ground for recusal, because you disagree with a ruling that the Court makes.

If you believe that it is wrong, then as I said, you will have a right to appeal. Now, I don't want to mislead you.

Not everything is appealable, but certainly some issues are.

But that will be the proper way to address that. So what I want to encourage you, sir, and you lawyers at this table, let's move this case along. It's been here far too long. I

want to see the thing go forward, and I would encourage you to be civil to each other. You can disagree without being disagreeable, and, frankly, I insist that you do.

If you have problems, then I will ask you to let me know. Call my office. I will make myself available by conference call within 15 minutes if I possibly can. Even if I'm in a trial, I'll try to accommodate that. Now, I'm not suggesting you call me on every little thing that comes up with a dispute, but I'm saying don't get at sword point and stop your engines and delay the case. If you have a problem that arises, call me, and I'll talk to you and see if we can sort it out and get a ruling on it and go forward with it.

And as you lawyers know, and Mr. Neeley, you now need to know, that once I do make a ruling, there's no point in going back and revisiting it over and over again because it's very unlikely I'm going to change it and it becomes annoying. So I'll hear you out, as I've tried to do today. Make your case, but once I make the call, then that's the call. Go on with it, and if when the matter is done, if you are concerned about it, then certainly you have the right of appeal.

So those are my sentiments on it. I'm going to let the record show that Mr. Neeley has indicated in open court that he does not in fact wish the Court to recuse, and so obviously the Court will not do so.

And again understand, I do read these things. I do

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pay attention to what you say and how you say it. When I write orders and my lawyers here advise me and help me draft orders, we try to be very careful about what we say and how we say it because words have meaning, and sometimes you stick a word in -- I think, Mr. Neeley, you've indicated you may have done that -- that's loaded. Now, this thing here, because you mentioned the word "recuse" and said you thought I ought to recuse for whatever reason, it's necessitated a hearing, which has caused you inconvenience to come down here. It's caused these lawyers and their clients inconvenience and expense to address it, but it has to happen because my obligation is to try to make sure that I'm holding that scale level and we've got a level playing field here. And so if the issue is raised that one side or the other believes that the Court is not being fair or there's a basis for recusal, I have to address that. I cannot ignore it. And so I have.

All right, Mr. Neeley, any further comments you wish to make, sir?

MR. NEELEY: Yes, sir. Your Honor, you referred to the fact that there are cases for interlocutory appeals, and I realize that earlier I did an interlocutory appeal, but I did not -- I did it while orders were pending, which is not allowed, and I had no idea that that was -- the Court could not -- the appellate court could not look at an order that was pending. And, however, I spoke to enough clerks at the court

and at the Supreme Court to know what the result would be if it were filed now, and I would rather it not have to go that route. I'd rather to -- however you have said that.

Asking to reconsider is annoying, and I do not want to do that. However, I believe that a interlocutory appeal is almost the same thing, and I believe that now I could do an interlocutory appeal because the case as it -- I realize that you're concerned the case is now behind schedule or had been a long time. I understand that and I respect that. However, I believe now that moving on forward is not prudent because it ignores most of the issues in the case, and I do not want to interlocutory appeal because I'm sick of this thing altogether, and I want it to stop. But I believe the only way now is to address all of the issues that have been denied because I didn't do them right the first time.

THE COURT: Well, I think the way to get the thing resolved and get done with it is to get on with it and get the case ready for trial and try it, and so I want to see us do that as quickly as possible. Any other comments?

MR. NEELEY: During the trial, can I raise issues that I feel should be there or is that not allowed?

THE COURT: You'll be obliged to follow the rules at trial just like the lawyers are. It's a handicap, Mr. Neeley, in representing yourself because it's -- I can't be your attorney. I'll be fair to you and try to make sure that you

have every opportunity to present your case fairly, but I can't advise you what to do. So the answer to your question is, you'll be governed by the same rules of evidence and procedure that the lawyers are. So if whatever you wish to present is appropriate and relevant, it'll be permitted. If not, it will not be.

MR. NEELEY: If evidence is available to demonstrate a claim that is not in the case now, can that be added during the trial? Is that allowed by the rules?

THE COURT: I'm not sure I followed the question. What we'll be focusing on, Mr. Neeley, if and when we get to trial, are the issues that are properly before the Court. I will not permit you to just range all over and put on evidence about anything that might annoy you about Google or any other defendant. No. I think that's the answer to your question. It has to be relevant to the issues that are before the Court to be tried. That's why we're having this discovery period coming up, to find out what the evidence will be relative to the issues that are in the case. So when we get to trial, we'll be confining the proof to those issues and not other problems that you may have with these defendants.

MR. NEELEY: Is there any -- why would anyone do an interlocutory appeal? Is there any benefit for an interlocutory appeal so that the issues at trial --

THE COURT: I don't know that I can answer that for

you, Mr. Neeley. There can, I guess, be a number of reasons why interlocutory appeals would be appropriate, in my judgment, and none of them apply in this case thus far. But I'm not sure why you have an interest in doing that. It delays the finality you say you seek. You say you're tired of this and you'd like to get it done. Well, let's go ahead and get it done, and then if there is a matter that you believe the Court has decided wrongly, you can take that up on the appeal after the case is over. Taking an interlocutory appeal will simply delay the ultimate finality of the case, which is what I believe you said you wanted, to get it done.

MR. NEELEY: Then I believe -- I appreciate it. I did not mean to appeal last time. However, I commend your staff, that if you actually say the word -- have the word "appeal" typed in a document, poof, you appealed.

THE COURT: Well, they're a good staff. I hate to say that in front of them, but it's true. All right, Mr. Neeley, anything else?

MR. NEELEY: No, thank you, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Ms. Doan, anything else?

MS. DOAN: Your Honor, I know you have a deadline for dispositive motions. We would be willing to file one before that, if the Court would entertain it, before the deadline.

THE COURT: Oh, yeah. I don't think we have a -- it's so rare that lawyers want to do anything before a

deadline. I don't know that I've heard that question before.

But, no, I think anytime you've got it ready, just get it done.

What we are trying to do, and you may or may not be aware of this, but right now, the business of this Court is much because I'm the only active judge here right now. The other two judges have taken senior status. We have a gentleman that we hope will be confirmed shortly, and we don't know about the other position, and so we do have a lot going on, and that's why continuances are hard to get, because the docket is so crowded. And so we like to try to keep our trial dates. I'd like to keep this matter on schedule. So if you can and will address a matter earlier, well and good. Fine.

MS. DOAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MS. DOAN: No, Your Honor.

MR. WHITE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you all. And I don't know that I'll be hearing from you before the holidays, but if not, I wish you all a happy holiday, and we are in recess.

(WHEREIN THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.)

## **COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE**

I, THERESA SAWYER, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/S/ Theresa Sawyer
THERESA SAWYER
CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER, #235

DECEMBER 15, 2010 (Date)